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TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS
REFUSES TO HOLD VENDORS OF
DEFECTIVE HOMES LIABLE
UNDER THE TEXAS TRADE
PRACTICES ACT
In two cases involving the purchase of structu-
rally defective homes, the Texas Court of Ap-
peals found in favor of the sellers. In Pfeiffer v.
Ebby Halliday Real Estate, 747 S.W.2d 887 (1988),
the court held that the seller of a home is liable
to the purchaser for damages only if the seller
has actual knowledge of a home's defects. In
Dubow v. Dragon, 746 S.W.2d 857 (1988), the
court held that a purchaser's own conduct in
making a "careful" inspection of the premises
supersedes any wrongdoing on the part of the
seller in failing to disclose defects in the home.
Both cases were brought under the Texas Decep-
tive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act
("the Act"), Tex Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §§ 17.41-
17.826 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1989).
The Act provides that false, misleading or
deceptive acts or practices in the course of trade
or business are illegal. Failure to disclose infor-
mation known at the time of the transaction is a
deceptive act if the failure to disclose was
intended to induce the consumer to enter into a
transaction which the consumer would not have
entered into had she been apprised of the
information. To maintain a cause of action under
the Act, the consumer must have proof that the
deceptive conduct was the "producing cause"
of the consumer's damages.
Pfeiffer v. Ebby Halliday Real Estate: Seller Must
Have Actual Knowledge of Home's Founda-
tional Defects
In Pfeiffer, a husband and wife purchased a
home which subsequently proved to have foun-
dation settling problems caused by soil condi-
tions. The Pfeiffers sued the seller, Ebby Halliday
Real Estate ("Ebby Halliday"), for failing to dis-
close the home's defect. The Pfeiffers alleged
that Ebby Halliday violated § 17.46(b)(23) of the
Act by failing to disclose information within its
actual knowledge at the time of the transaction.
According to the Pfeiffers, Ebby Halliday in-
tended to induce the Pfeiffers to buy the home
by failing to mention the home's foundation
defect. The trial court entered a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict in favor of Ebby Halli-
day and the Pfeiffers appealed. The Texas Court
of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence
did not raise a question of fact for a jury as to
Ebby Halliday's unconscionable conduct.
On appeal, the Pfeiffers contended that the
evidence raised questions of fact for the jury
regarding Ebby Halliday's unconscionable con-
duct as well as its knowledge of the foundation
defect. As proof of Ebby Halliday's knowledge of
the home's defect, the Pfeiffers pointed to a
history of unspecified problems and repairs, and
to visual evidence of previous foundation re-
pairs. The Pfeiffers also argued that several real
estate brokers in the community would not list
the property because it was common knowl-
edge among these brokers that the home had
foundation problems. Prior to the purchase of
the home, the Pfeiffers hired an expert recom-
mended by Ebby Halliday. After inspecting the
home, the expert submitted a report which
stated that there was ''some foundation settling."
Regarding the allegation that Ebby Halliday's
conduct constituted a deceptive trade practice,
the court held that a seller does not commit a
deceptive trade practice by failing to disclose
information of which the seller has no knowl-
edge. The court noted that the Act is violated
only when the offending party fails to disclose
information which was known to the party at the
time of the transaction. Ebby Halliday could not
be held liable under the Act for failing to dis-
close information it did not have at the time of
the transaction.
Similarly, the court held that Ebby Halliday's
conduct was not unconscionable. Pursuant to
§ 17.45(5) of the Act, an unconscionable act
"takes advantage of the lack of knowledge, abil-
ity, or capacity of a person to a grossly unfair
degree." The court held that the Ebby Halliday's
conduct was not grossly unfair. Based on the
expert's inspection report, the Pfeiffers knew
about the home's foundation settling, and thus
could not have been taken advantage of by the
seller. The Pfeiffers presented evidence that
Ebby Halliday took advantage of their lack of
knowledge of local soil conditions. The Pfeiffers
were from California and had no knowledge of
the foundation problems caused by soil condi-
tions in Carrollton, Texas. They maintained that
it was common knowledge in the area that local
soil conditions caused foundation problems,
and from this fact, a jury could conclude that
Ebby Halliday knew about the home's defect. In
addition, the Pfeiffers stated that they had been
told by Ebby Halliday's office manager that it was
not Ebby Halliday's responsibility to notify poten-
tial buyers about soil conditions.
Examining this evidence in the light most
favorable to the Pfeiffers, the appellate court
concluded that Ebby Halliday had no actual
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knowledge of the foundation defect. The court
stated that the Pfeiffers presented no evidence
of probative value to support the finding that
Ebby Halliday knew of the foundation's condi-
tion. The previous repairs to the foundation did
not establish the seller's knowledge because,
according to the court, repairs correct defects
rather than prove their continued known exist-
ence. Further, common knowledge regarding
local soil conditions and the fact that other real
estate agencies refused to list the home was
insufficient to establish actual knowledge as
required by the Act.
Dubow v. Dragon: Seller's Alleged Misrepresen-
tation as to Home's Condition was not "Produc-
ing Cause" of the Purchasers' Damages
In Dubow, the plaintiffs were also a husband
and wife. They observed that the home they
wished to purchase from the Dragons was run
down and needed some work. Because the
Dubows expected to refurbish and to repair the
home, they negotiated with the Dragons to buy
the home for $50,000 less than the asking price.
Under the purchase agreement, the Dubows
had the right to have the home inspected prior
to closing. The closing was contingent upon the
receipt of favorable information in the inspec-
tion reports.
Two specialists looked at the home and re-
ported that it had several problems: differential
movement in the slab, stress cracks, sloping
floors, separation of brick veneer from door and
window frames, and roof leaks. The estimate for
repairs was $4,000. Concerned with the potential
for more problems with the home, the Dubows
demanded that the sale price be further reduced
by $17,500. The Dragons agreed, and the Dub-
ows purchased the home.
The modified contract stated that, after a care-
ful inspection of the home which revealed the
need for on-going maintenance, the purchasers
had agreed to buy the home "as is, WITH ALL
CONTINGENCIES REMOVED." 746 S.W.2d at
859 (emphasis in original). After the sale, the
Dubows encountered more problems and sub-
sequently filed suit, alleging that the Dragons
had informed the Dubows that the home was a
"good house with no problems" and that this
misrepresentation had induced the Dubows to
buy the home.
The trial court granted summary judgement in
favor of the Dragons, and the Dubows appealed.
On appeal, the main issue before the court was
whether the Dubows had presented evidence
from which ajury could conclude that the Drag-
ons' alleged misrepresentation was the "produc-
ing cause" of the purchasers' damages. A pro-
ducing cause is the contributing cause or factual
causation of the purchasers' damages. Under
§ 17.46(b) of the Act, "producing cause," rather
than reliance, is the proper legal standard.
The appellate court concluded that any al-
leged misrepresentation by the Dragons was
superseded by the Dubows' knowledge of the
home's defects based on the expert's reports.
The court determined that the Dubows used this
information to obtain a lowered purchase price
and that they were fully informed about the
home's problems. The Dubows' careful inspec-
tion of the home provided an independent basis
for their decision to purchase. Accordingly,
because the "producing cause" element was
lacking, the court held that the Dubows had no
cause of action as a matter of law.
Purchasers Take Responsibility for Transaction
Pfeiffer and Dubow use different rationales to
reach similar conclusions. In Pfeiffer, the court
held that the seller is not liable for information
the seller did not have at the time of the transac-
tion. The court interpreted § 17.46(b)(23) of the
Act narrowly by requiring the seller to have
actual knowledge of a home's defective condi-
tions. The court also indicated that a purchaser is
obligated to investigate once the purchaser has
knowledge that there may be a problem with
the home. The responsibility to investigate is not
with the seller.
In Dubow, the court stated that a purchaser's
own conduct can break the chain of causation
despite any alleged misconduct by the seller.
Once the purchaser knows about the condition
of a home prior to purchase but buys the house
nonetheless, any misrepresentation by the seller
becomes immaterial. The court emphasized that
the purchasers had detailed information which
allowed them to buy the house for a substan-
tially reduced price.
The purchasers in Pfeiffer and Dubow had
varying degrees of knowledge concerning the
defective conditions of their homes. In both
cases, the appellate court found that the infor-
mation these purchasers had about their home's
problems prior to purchase was enough to
release the sellers from liability. In short, these
informed purchasers could not use the Act to
rescind a bad purchase.
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